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  The first two authors contributed equally to this work. Abstract 
Motivated  by  computational  analyses,  we  look  at  how  teaching  affects  exploration  and 
discovery.    In  Experiment  1,  we  investigated  children’s  exploratory  play  after  an  adult 
pedagogically demonstrated a function of a toy, after an interrupted pedagogical demonstration, 
after a naïve adult demonstrated the function, and at baseline. Preschoolers in the pedagogical 
condition focused almost exclusively on the target function; by contrast, children in the other 
conditions explored broadly.  In Experiment 2, we show that children restrict their exploration 
both  after  direct  instruction  to  themselves  and  after  overhearing  direct  instruction  given  to 
another child; they do not show this constraint after observing direct instruction given to an adult 
or after observing a non-pedagogical intentional action. We discuss these findings as the result of 
rational inductive biases. In pedagogical contexts, a teacher’s failure to provide evidence for 
additional functions provides evidence for their absence; such contexts generalize from child to 
child (because children are likely to have comparable states of knowledge) but not from adult to 
child.    Thus,  pedagogy  promotes  efficient  learning  but  at  a  cost:  children  are  less  likely  to 
perform potentially irrelevant actions but also less likely to discover novel information.  
 
Key Terms – Pedagogy, Bayesian Model, Exploratory Play, Discovery, Causal Learning, 
Cognitive Development The principal goal of education is to create men who are capable of 
doing new things, not simply of repeating what other generations have done - men 
who are creative, inventive and discoverers.  Jean Piaget. 
 
Two  competing  intuitions  animate  longstanding  debates  over  children's  learning: that 
children  learn  primarily  from  helpful,  informative  others  (through  testimony  or  “direct 
instruction”;  Vygotsky,  1978;  Csibra  &  Gergeley,  2009;  Gergely,  Kiraly,  &  Egyed,  2007; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005; Kushnir, Wellman, & Gelman, 2008; Tomasello & Barton, 1994), and 
that, especially in the early years, children learn chiefly through their own active exploration of 
the  environment  (“constructivist”  or  “discovery  learning”;  Bonawitz,  Lim,  &  Schulz,  2007; 
Bonawitz & Schulz, in review; Bruner, Jolly, & Sylva, 1976; Gweon & Schulz, 2008; Piaget, 
1929; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007; Singer, Golinkoff, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2008). Here we suggest that 
the tension between learning from others and from self-guided exploration stems in part from a 
principled trade-off at the heart of pedagogical learning. Teaching
1 produces an inductive bias 
that constrains children’s hypothesis  space for better and for worse: in promoting rapid and 
efficient  learning  of  target  material,  pedagogical  instruction  necessarily  limits  the  range  of 
hypotheses children consider. 
  Our inquiry is motivated by an ideal learner analysis—what should a student infer from 
evidence given by a helpful teacher? Recent research has formalized pedagogical learning as an 
inference based on the paired assumptions that a learner will rationally update her belief in a 
hypothesis given new data (from a pedagogical demonstration) and that a teacher will choose 
data (a particular demonstration) likely to increase the learner’s belief in the correct hypothesis 
                                                             
1 Throughout, reference to teachers and teaching refer, not only to classroom instruction, but to any knowledgeable, helpful 
communicative partner providing instruction to a less knowledgeable partner. (Shafto  &  Goodman,  2008;  Shafto,  Goodman, &  Griffiths,  in review).  In  what  follows,  we 
present  details  of  our  Bayesian  analysis  and  two  experiments  motivated  from  this  analysis, 
exploring the consequences of pedagogical inference on preschool-aged children’s exploration 
and discovery. 
An ideal learner will update her beliefs rationally given the demonstration (or data), d, as 
described by Bayes’ theorem: 
PL(h|d)   P(d|h) PL(h).                         (1) 
In Equation 1, PL(h) represents the learner’s prior beliefs in a hypothesis h. The term P(d|h), 
called the likelihood or sampling assumption, captures the learner’s assumption about the source 
of the data. If the learner did not believe the data were chosen by a helpful teacher, then we 
would use a default sampling assumption in equation (1): PD(d|h). This default will depend on 
the situation, and captures the natural source of evidence in the absence of a teacher (e.g. by 
random exploration). However, if the learner assumes that a helpful teacher has chosen the data, 
we must use a pedagogical sampling assumption: 
PL(h|d)   PT(d|h) PL(h),                        (1’) 
PT(d|h)   PL(h|d)                           (2) 
Equation 2 captures the idea that the data are chosen by the teacher in such a way that they will 
increase the probability that the learner assigns to the correct hypothesis. Note that the teacher’s 
choice of data depends in turn on the assumption that the learner will rationally update her 
beliefs. Equations 1’ and 2, and the default sampling assumption, define a system of equations 
that provides a model of how having a teacher should affect a learner’s inferences. Intuitively, 
one  can  imagine  beginning  with  the  inferences  the  learner  would  draw  under  the  default 
sampling assumption, then using equations 1’ and 2 iteratively to “strengthen” these inferences into the ideal pedagogical inferences.  (See Shafto & Goodman, 2008; Shafto, Goodman, & 
Griffiths, under review, for further discussion.) 
Consider, for example, inferences about novel toy, which has M potential affordances (a 
fixed,  but  arbitrary,  large  number)  of  which  an  unknown  number,  n,  will  activate  latent 
functions. We imagine a default sampling process in which m affordances are tested at random 
(without knowledge of which ones have a function—this is called a weak sampling assumption, 
Tenenbaum, 1999). Under this default, an observation of m tests resulting in n functions provides 
strong evidence for these n functions but provides no evidence for, or against, any functions of 
untested affordances. In particular, the learner gains no information beyond her a priori beliefs 
about the untested affordances: even though she may believe that functions are rare (Oaksford & 
Chater, 1994) and hence additional functions are unlikely, the evidence does not enhance this 
inference compared to baseline. 
In a pedagogical context, by Equation 2,  a teacher should demonstrate all the actual 
functions: if she demonstrated fewer, the learner would consider more hypotheses, and hence, 
each (including the correct one) would receive lower probability. She should demonstrate the 
functioning affordances (rather than the non-functions) because these are a priori rare; hence, 
observing  them  raises  the  probability  of  the  correct  hypothesis  more  than  observing  non-
functions. Given this, the learner will infer, by Equation 1’, that the demonstrated functions are 
exhaustive—all the functions will be demonstrated by a helpful teacher.  (Further iterations of 
Equations 1’ and 2 will strengthen this inference, but not change the qualitative conclusion.) 
Thus, the inference that there are no additional functions to be discovered will be strong in a 
pedagogical context but weak (and no stronger than at baseline) in a default context.   What factors affect whether a child should interpret a given context as pedagogical? The 
above analysis depends on the assumption that the data are chosen by a knowledgeable, helpful 
teacher. If the evidence is sampled randomly (e.g., by a teacher who is ignorant of the true 
hypothesis or by the naïve learner herself), the default sampling assumption should be used, as 
described above, and the absence of additional functions should not be inferred. Similarly, if the 
teacher is interrupted in the middle of giving the evidence, it will be ambiguous whether the 
teacher would have gone on to demonstrate additional functions; in this case the evidence also 
does not imply absence of additional functions. Note that we will treat such cases as “non-
pedagogical”, even if they involve superficial cues to pedagogy (i.e., an adult engaging in joint 
attention and providing ostensive communicative cues to a child; Csibra & Gergely, 2009). Such 
cues may be useful precisely because they tend to predict pedagogical sampling, but if, in a 
particular instance, pedagogical sampling has clearly not occurred, the inferential assumptions of 
pedagogy should not hold.  
This  analysis  suggests  a  trade-off  between  instruction  and  exploration.    Because 
pedagogical inferences constrain the hypotheses children consider, children should be efficient 
learners in pedagogical contexts, but they may well assume there is nothing further to learn.  (If 
there  were,  the  teacher  should  have  provided  evidence  accordingly.)  Thus,  when  a 
knowledgeable  teacher  freely  demonstrates  a  function  of  a  toy,  children  should  engage  in 
relatively  limited  exploration  and  discover  little  else  about  the  toy.  By  contrast,  in  non-
pedagogical contexts, children should not be restricted to any one function, even if demonstrated.  
Children should take all the toy’s affordances into account (as they would at baseline) and thus 
explore broadly.  In Experiment 1, we test these predictions by looking at whether, relative to 
children in non-pedagogical contexts, children given pedagogically sampled evidence about a toy explore  the  toy  more  briefly,  perform  fewer  unique  actions,  and  discover  fewer  non-
demonstrated functions. 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
  Participants. Eighty-five preschoolers participated (mean age: 58 months; range: 48–72 
months) in an urban science museum. Most children were white and middle-class, but a range of 
ethnicities resembling the diversity of the population was represented.  
  Design. Preschoolers participated in one of four conditions: 25 children in a Pedagogical 
condition  and  20  each  in  one  of  three  Non-Pedagogical  conditions:  Interrupted,  Naive,  and 
Baseline. There were no differences in the age of the children across conditions: F(4,81)=0.30, p 
=ns.  
  Materials. A novel-looking toy was created using colored PVC pipes attached to a board 
(see Figure 1). The toy was approximately 18”x6”x15”. The toy had four different non-obvious 
causal affordances: it made a squeak sound when a yellow-colored tube was pulled out from 
inside a larger purple tube; one end of a blue tube lit up when a small button hidden inside the 
other end was pressed; a small yellow pad attached to the plastic board played music notes when 
different parts of the pad were pressed; there were two adjoining black tubes with mirrors inside 
so that a reversed mirror image of the observer’s face was visible. All other aspects of the toy 
were inert. 
  
 
Figure 1. Novel toy stimuli used in experiments 1 and 2. 
 
  Procedure. Children were tested individually in a quiet corner of the museum. In all 
conditions,  the  experimenter  brought  the  toy  out  from  under  the  table.  In  the Pedagogical 
condition, the experimenter said, “Look at my toy! This is my toy. I’m going to show you how 
my toy works. Watch this!” The experimenter then pulled the yellow tube out from the purple 
tube to produce the squeak sound. She said, “Wow, see that? This is how my toy works!” and 
demonstrated the same action again. The Interrupted condition was exactly like the Pedagogical 
condition, except that the experimenter interrupted herself immediately after the demonstration 
saying, “I just realized, I have to stop because I forgot to write down something over there.  I 
have to go take care of it right now!”” In the Naïve condition, the experimenter said, “I just 
found this toy! See this toy?” As she brought out the toy from underneath the table, she pulled 
the  yellow  tube  out  from  the  purple  tube  as  if she  did  so  by  accident.  Then  she  said  as  if 
surprised, “Huh! Did you see that? Let me try to do that!” and performed the same action to 
produce  the  squeak  sound.  In  the  Baseline  condition,  the  experimenter  did  not  initially demonstrate the squeaking function of the toy. After she brought out the toy from underneath the 
table, she picked up the toy and said, “Wow, see this toy?  Look at this!” She looked at the toy 
for about 2 seconds (to match the other conditions for amount of familiarization time), and then 
put it back on the table. 
  In all conditions, the experimenter then said, “Wow, isn’t that cool? I’m going to let you 
play and see if you can figure out how this toy works. Let me know when you’re done!” and left 
the child to play. If the child said that she was finished or stopped interacting with the toy for 
more than 5 consecutive seconds without indicating completion, the experimenter prompted the 
child by saying, “Are you done?”   She returned to the table and terminated the experiment if the 
child answered, “Yes”. Otherwise, she let the child continue to play and then returned to the 
table to terminate the experiment if the child stopped interacting with the toy a second time for 
more than 5 seconds.  All sessions were videotaped and coded by a research assistant blind to 
hypothesis and a second research assistant blind to hypotheses and condition.  Total playtime, the 
number of unique actions performed, time playing with the squeaker, and the number of target 
functions (light, music, and mirror) discovered during play were coded. All but two children 
(excluded due to technical malfunction) were reliability coded on total playtime, unique actions, 
and number of target functions; 75% of clips were reliability coded for time with squeaker.   
Results and Discussion 
Because we had a priori hypotheses about the patterns of results, we performed planned 
linear contrasts throughout. We formalized the prediction that the Pedagogical condition would 
differ  from  the  Interrupted,  Naïve  and  Baseline  conditions  and  that  the  Non-Pedagogical 
conditions would not differ from each other by conducting the analyses with the weights 3, -1, -
1, and -1 for the four conditions, respectively.  The analyses will thus be significant when there is a difference between the Pedagogical and Non-Pedagogical conditions, and no difference among 
the Non-Pedagogical conditions. 
  
To look at whether children engaged in less exploration in the Pedagogical condition 
than in the other three conditions, we coded children’s total time playing, the number of unique 
actions  children  performed,  the  proportion  of  children’s  play  time  spent  only  on  the 
demonstrated function (excluding the Baseline condition where no demonstration was provided), 
and the total number of target functions discovered in the course of free play.  For the number of 
unique actions performed, we coded all the actions children performed during free play, which 
included  all  four  possible  target  actions  in  addition  to  any  other  kind  of  action  the  child 
performed; we enumerated the different kinds of actions, rather than individual actions per se. 
(Thus, seven pulls on the tube were counted as one action, whereas one pull on the tube and one 
activation of the light were counted as two actions.) Reliability on all measures was high. (Total 
time  playing:  r
2=.99;  Actions  taken  on  toy:  kappa=.77;  Time  playing  with  squeaking  tube: 
r
2=.96; Functions discovered: kappa=.86). 
All the linear contrasts were significant. Children in the Pedagogical condition played 
with the toy for significantly less time (M=119.2s) than children in the Interrupted (M=179.6s), 
Naïve (M=132.7s), or Baseline (M=205.7) conditions (F(1,81)=4.52, p<0.05). Children in the 
Pedagogical condition also performed fewer different kinds of actions on the toy (M=4.00) than 
children  in  the  Interrupted  (M=5.30),  Naïve  (M=5.90)  or  Baseline  (M=6.15)  conditions, 
F(1,81)=9.39, p<0.01).  This result held even when the playtime was matched across conditions; 
looking  only  at  the  number  of  actions  performed  in  the  first  60  seconds,  children  in  the 
Pedagogical  condition  performed  fewer  actions  (M=3.16)  than  children  in  the  Interrupted 
(M=3.75), Naïve (M=4.90), and Baseline (M=4.15) conditions, F(1,81)=7.18, p < 0.05.  What  did  children  do  when  they  played?  Although  children  in  the  Pedagogical, 
Interrupted, and Naïve condition had all seen the experimenter pull the tube to make the squeak 
sound, they did not spend equal proportions of their playtime acting on the squeaker tube across 
conditions. Children in the Pedagogical condition spent a greater proportion of time playing with 
the  squeaker  (M=0.68)  than  children  in  the  other  conditions  where  the  squeaker  was 
demonstrated:  Interrupted  (M=.53),  Naive  (M=.38)  conditions,  F(1,  62)=13.91,  p<0.001.
2  
Finally, we gave children one point for each of the target functions, other than the squeaker tube, 
that they discovered during their free play.  Thus, children could receive a score between 0 and 3. 
Children in the Pedagogical condition discovered fewer of these target functions (M=0.72) than 
children  in  the  Interrupted  (M=1.3),  Naïve  (M=1.2),  or  Baseline  (M=1.15)  conditions, 
F(1,81)=4.58, p<0.05.  
These  results  suggest  that  teaching  constrains  children’s  exploration  and  discovery.  
Children who were taught a function of a toy performed fewer kinds of actions of the toy and 
discovered  fewer  of  its  other  functions,  than  children  who  did  not  receive  a  pedagogical 
demonstration,  even  though  all  children  were  explicitly  encouraged  to  explore  the  toy.  We 
predicted  such  constrained  exploration  as  the  result  of  a  rational  inductive  inference:  if  a 
knowledgeable  teacher  provides  evidence  for  a  function  of  a  toy,  absence  of  evidence  for 
alternative functions provides strong evidence for their absence.   
Experiment 2  
  Our ideal learner analysis suggests that the assumptions of pedagogical sampling apply 
when the learner believes that the teacher is choosing evidence in order to convey a particular 
hypothesis.    As  discussed,  this  implies  that  learners  might  treat  some  contexts  as  “non-
pedagogical” even though an adult engages in direct, ostensive cuing to a child (as in the Naïve 
                                                             
2 Because the Baseline condition was not included in this analysis, the linear contrast weight were adjusted to 2, -1, -1. and Interrupted conditions of Experiment 1).  Critically, the converse is also true: children might 
treat some contexts as “pedagogical” even in the absence of direct, ostensive cueing. According 
to the model, the teacher should choose data that are tailored to the individual being taught.  
Thus, the pedagogical model can apply both to situations when the teacher is directly teaching 
the  learner,  and  to  situations  when  the  learner overhears  a  teacher  instructing  someone  else 
whose prior beliefs are similar to the learner’s own. This predicts that learners may engage in 
pedagogical inference even when merely observing, rather than participating in, a pedagogical 
situation.  We  call  the  requirement  needed  to  engage  pedagogical  assumptions  for overheard 
teaching the “similar priors” assumption. 
Formally,  the  teacher’s  choice  of  data, PT(d|h),  should  depend  on  the  learner’s  prior 
beliefs, PL(h), as described by Equations 1’ and 2. In the basic pedagogical situation, there is a 
teacher and a learner (L1). Now consider a situation in which there is a second learner, L2, who 
has the same prior beliefs as L1 and vicariously observes the interaction between the teacher and 
L1. In this case, the data generated by the teacher are intended to teach L1; however, because L2 
has the same prior beliefs as L1, Equations 1’ and 2 are identical to what they would be if the 
teacher would had intended to teach L2. Consequently, if L2 is observing while L1 is being 
taught, and L2 can assume that she and L1 have similar beliefs, then L2 can treat a pedagogical 
demonstration to L1 as if it were a demonstration to L2 herself.  In contrast, if the priors for the 
learners  are  very  different  (PL1(h)    P L2(h)),  then  appropriate  demonstrations  could  be  quite 
different for the different learners—a teacher would potentially choose different data to teach the 
same hypothesis to the different learners
3.  Thus, if L2 is observing L1 and assumes that L1 has 
                                                             
3 This assumption also holds if L2 believes that L1’s interests were different (e.g. the teacher may not demonstrate all the 
functions to L1 because she assumed that some of the functions would not be interesting to L1, but those functions may be 
interesting to L2.)  beliefs different from her own, then she should not assume that the pedagogical demonstration to 
L1 generalize to herself. 
Most previous research (e.g. Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Topal et al., 2008; see 
Csibra & Gergely, 2009 for a review) has focused on one-on-one pedagogical situations in which 
the  teacher  engages  the  learner  using  direct  ostensive  cuing  (e.g.,  establishing  eye-contact, 
shifting  gaze  between  the  object  and  the  learner,  and  using  the  child’s  name)  prior  to  the 
demonstration. Such work suggests that  children are more likely both to learn demonstrated 
material and to generalize it to novel contexts in teaching than in non-teaching situations (e.g. 
Gergely,  Bekkering,  &  Kiraly,  2002;  Topal  et al.,  2008;  see  Csibra  &  Gergely,  2009  for  a 
review).   This  is  consistent  with  Csibra  and  Gergely’s  (2009)  proposal  that  ostensive  cuing 
engages special learning mechanisms (see also Tomasello et al., 2005).  Under these theories, 
ostensive cues are a critical component of pedagogy; we might therefore expect that the effects 
of teaching would only be present when ostensive cues are directed towards the learner herself.   
However, our analysis suggests a more nuanced relationship between indirect cues in 
pedagogy  and  the  resulting  inferences  of  the  observing  learner.    In  an  indirect  pedagogical 
demonstration,  a  knowledgeable  teacher  engages  a  child  (L1)  in  ostensive  cuing  and  then 
demonstrates a function of the novel toy with a second learner (L2) observing. The teacher’s 
choice of demonstrations depends only on the learner’s (L1’s) beliefs.  Thus, the overheard 
demonstration supports the same inferences as a direct pedagogical situation if the observer (L2) 
believes  that  the  learner’s  (L1’s)  beliefs  are  like  her  own.    The  observer  should  not  draw 
inferences  consistent  with  pedagogical  sampling  if  the  demonstration  is  to  a  learner  with 
different beliefs than the observer’s own.   In Experiment 2, we look at whether children’s pedagogical inferences depend primarily 
on  direct  ostensive  cueing  or  whether  pedagogical  inferences  are  also  engaged  when  an 
observing child shares knowledge states with the recipient of direct instruction.  To investigate 
children’s  inferences  in  indirect  pedagogical  situations,  we  contrast  exploratory  play  in  four 
conditions:  after  a  direct  pedagogical  demonstration  (the Direct  condition),  after  an  indirect 
demonstration to a child (the Indirect Child condition), after an indirect demonstration to an 
adult (the Indirect Adult condition), and after a non-pedagogical intentional action that the child 
overhears  (the  Intentional  condition).  The  Direct  condition  provides  a  replication  of  the 
Pedagogical condition in Experiment 1: children should show limited exploration and be less 
likely to discover the other, non-demonstrated properties of the toy.  The Intentional condition, 
provides a control for the intentional manipulation of the toy, but does not provide pedagogical 
information for the children (see also Goodman, Baker, Tenenbaum, 2009).  In this condition, 
the experimenter performs the same action as in the pedagogical condition, but makes it clear to 
the child that her intention is to satisfy her own preferences not to engage in instruction.  We 
expect that children will explore readily in this condition, replicating the Baseline and Accidental 
conditions of Experiment 1.   
Our  key  questions  center  on  the  Indirect  Child  and  Indirect  Adult  conditions.  If 
pedagogical inferences depend on direct ostensive cuing, then children in both of the Indirect 
conditions should be less susceptible to the pedagogical context, thus exploring the toy more and 
discovering more of its properties, than children in the Direct condition. If direct ostensive cues 
are  not  necessary,  and  pedagogical  inferences  extend  to  situations  where  the  observing  and 
observed learner have similar beliefs, then we expect a different pattern of results.  Namely, we 
predicted that children would treat another child as having beliefs similar to their own but would not make this assumption about adult learners.  If this is the case, then children should extend the 
pedagogical inference in the Indirect Child condition but not in the Indirect Adult condition.  As 
a result, we predict more exploratory play and discovery learning in Indirect Adult condition than 
in the Indirect Child condition.  
Methods 
  Participants. Sixty-four
4 preschoolers (mean age: 61 months, range: 48–72 months; 56% 
girls) were recruited in a metropolitan Science Museum.  Most children were white and middle-
class, but a range of ethnicities resembling the diversity of the population was represented.  
Design. Preschoolers were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: Direct, Indirect 
Child, Indirect Adult, or Intentional condition.  There were no differences in the age of the 
children across conditions: F(2,56)=0.58, p=ns. An additional sixteen children (unrelated to the 
participants  and  approximately  the  same  age)  were  recruited  as  the  primary  learners  in  the 
Indirect  Child  condition  and  sixteen  adults  (parents  of  the  children)  participated  as  primary 
learners in the Indirect Adult condition. 
Materials. The same novel toy from Experiment 1 was used. 
Procedure.  Children  were  tested  in  a  quiet  corner  in  the  museum.  The  experiment 
included two phases: observation and play.  
Observation phase. In the observation phase, children observed a demonstration of one 
property of the toy, which varied by condition. As in Experiment 1, in the Direct condition, the 
experimenter said, “Look at my toy! This is my toy. I’m going to show you how my toy works. 
Watch this!” The experimenter then pulled the yellow tube out from the purple tube to produce 
the squeak sound. She said, “Wow, see that? This is how my toy works!” and demonstrated the 
                                                             
4 Two children were dropped and replaced. One child was replaced because of a technical error (camera malfunctioned; play 
was not coded; Indirect Adult condition), and the second child fell off her chair during the experiment and could not continue 
(Indirect Child condition).  same action again.  In the Indirect Child, and Indirect Adult conditions, the experimenter first 
said to the child participant “I have to go over here for a second, but I’ll be right back.”  The 
experimenter then moved to a table approximately 2 meters from the participant and performed 
the procedure above either to the other child recruited for this purpose (Indirect Child) or to the 
observing child’s parent (Indirect Adult). In the Intentional condition, the demonstrator said to 
the child, “Look at my toy. This is my toy.  I have to go over here for a second, but I’ll be right 
back.”  As with the Indirect conditions, the experimenter moved approximately 2 meters from 
the child participant but then said (talking out loud, to herself) “I like to make my toy squeak.  
Wow! I’m going to do that again” and performed the action twice without any ostensive cuing.  
Play phase. After the child observed that pulling the tube made the squeaking sound, the 
experimenter (returning to the table in the Indirect
5 and Intentional conditions) said, “I’m going 
to go ahead and let you play. Let me know when you’re done!” and left the child to play.  Play 
was ended following the same criteria as Experiment 1.  
Results and Discussion  
The results were analyzed as in Experiment 1.  We formalized the prediction that the 
Direct  and  Indirect  Child  conditions  would  differ  from  the  Indirect  Adult  and  Intentional 
conditions  using  contrast  weights  of  1,  1,  and  -1,  -1,  respectively.  The  analyses  will  be 
significant when there is a difference between mean of the Direct and Indirect Child and the 
mean of the Indirect Adult and Intentional conditions, and no differences between the Direct and 
Indirect Child conditions, and the Indirect Adult and Intentional conditions. 
As in Experiment 1, we coded children’s total time playing, the number of different kinds 
of  actions  the  children  performed,  their  time  spent  on  only  the  demonstrated  function  (the 
                                                             
5 After the demonstration in the Indirect Child Conditions, a research assistant helping the experimenter gave the child who 
was recruited as the target of instruction another activity to pursue, out of sight of the child who was the experimental participant.  
Parents who participated in the Indirect Adult Conditions stepped out of their child’s line of sight.   squeaking tube), and the number of target functions discovered in the course of free play. All 
children were reliability coded on action and play measures.  Reliability coders were blind to 
condition  and  hypotheses.    Reliability  on  all  measures  was  high.  (Actions  taken  on  toy: 
kappa=0.82; Total time playing: r=0.99; Time playing with squeaking tube: r=0.96). 
With the exception of overall play time, which did not differ between conditions (Direct, 
M=70s; Indirect Child M=105s, Indirect Adult M=84s, Intentional, M=125s; F(1,60)=.92, p=ns) 
all the linear contrasts were significant.  Children in the Direct (M=3.13) and Indirect Child 
(M=3.94) condition performed fewer different kinds of actions on the toy than children in the 
Indirect  Adult  (M=5.31)  and  Intentional  (M=5.13)  conditions,  F(1,60)=11.50,  p<0.01.  The 
difference  between  the  Direct  (M=2.88)  and  Indirect  Child  (M=2.94)  and  Indirect  Adult 
(M=4.94) and Intentional (M=4.38) conditions persists considering only actions produced in the 
first 60 seconds of play, F(1,60)=17.57, p<.0001. 
What did children do when they played? Although children had all seen the experimenter 
pull the tube to make the squeak sound, children in the Direct (M=52%) and Indirect Child 
(M=60%) conditions spent a larger percentage of their playtime acting on the squeaking tube 
than  children  in  the  Indirect  Adult  (M=37%)  and  Intentional  (M=36%)  conditions, 
F(1,60)=10.08, p<.01. Looking at individual children, we gave children one point for each of the 
non-demonstrated functions that they discovered, thus children could receive a score between 0 
and 3.  Children’s mean score was lower in the Direct (M=.50) and Indirect Child (M=.75) 
conditions than the Indirect Adult (M=1.31) and Intentional (M=1.00) conditions, F(1,60)=6.38, 
p<.05,  even  when  controlling  for  duration of  play  by  considering  only  the  first  60  seconds 
(Direct,  M=.44;  Indirect  Child,  M=.44;  Indirect  Adult,  M=1.19;  Intentional,  M=.81; 
F(1,60)=9.88, p<0.01).    These  results  replicate  and  extend  the  findings  of  Experiment  1,  showing  that 
preschoolers’ tendency to explore and discover new properties are limited in pedagogical settings 
relative to other intentional conditions.  Moreover, they show that preschool children rationally 
extend  their  assumptions  about  pedagogical  situations  to  contexts  in  which  they  overhear 
instruction to comparable learners; they are not dependent on direct ostensive cues.  Note that it 
is possible that children were less likely to constrain their exploration in the Indirect Adult than 
the Indirect Child condition simply because they paid less attention to the former than then latter.  
Certainly  children  might  have  found  an  unfamiliar  child  more  interesting  than  the  familiar 
parent.  We cannot rule this explanation out entirely.  However, one reason to believe it is not the 
case, is that the conditions differed only with respect to children’s tendency to infer the absence 
of uninstructed functions; children were equally likely to learn the demonstrated function in the 
two conditions.  Of course, we do not know exactly in what respects children believed that their 
own knowledge was comparable to another child’s but not to an adult’s; they might for instance 
have assumed that relative to other children, adults are either more or less knowledgeable about 
toys.  Future research might investigate in more detail what aspects of knowledge go into how 
children infer “similar priors” between themselves and another learner. However, the current 
results suggest that even very young children consider the prior knowledge of other learners in 
identifying contexts that license the inferences of pedagogical sampling. 
General Discussion 
Inspired by the ideas of Piaget and Vygotsky, we set out to investigate the implications of 
explicit  instruction  on  exploratory  play.    We  presented  a  formal  model  that  captures  our 
intuitions about how sampling assumptions (in pedagogical and non-pedagogical contexts) could 
influence a learner’s hypothesis space about possible causal models of the world.  Our empirical results  are  consistent  with  the  qualitative  predictions  of  our  model. The results  suggest  that 
teaching constrains children’s exploration and discovery.  Children who were taught a function 
of a toy performed fewer kinds of actions on the toy and discovered fewer of its other functions, 
than children who did not receive a pedagogical demonstration. We predicted such constrained 
exploration as the result of a rational inductive inference: if a knowledgeable teacher provides 
evidence for a function of a toy, absence of evidence for alternative functions provides strong 
evidence for their absence.   
The children’s behavior is rational but is it desirable?  If showing four and five-year-olds 
a function of a toy means that they explore less and consequently learn less about it, do the costs 
of direct instruction outweigh the benefits?   We believe that there is no fully general answer to 
this question.  The costs and benefits of instruction depend on how knowledgeable and helpful 
the teacher is, and on how likely the learner is to discover either the target information or novel 
information on her own. The inductive bias by which teaching constrains the learner’s hypothesis 
space cuts both ways. 
These  trade-offs  can  be  seen  in  our  example.    In  order  to  investigate  the  effect  of 
instruction  on  exploration,  we  deliberately  designed  a  toy  with  more  affordances  than  we 
demonstrated. A knowledgeable teacher, with sufficient time and motivation and without other 
constraints, would have shown the children all the target functions.  In this case, not only would 
the children have learned all four functions, there would also arguably have been little else for 
them to discover.   Given such a teacher, increasing the probability that children will learn the 
target information may be well worth decreasing the (already low) probability that they will 
discover novel information. By contrast, a teacher who knows only one of our toy's functions or 
who is constrained in her actions might be able to demonstrate only a single function (as the experimenter, deceptively, did here).  Such instruction effectively focused children on the target 
function, but impaired their ability to discover novel information. Thus, if a teacher is relatively 
uninformed and/or a domain is largely unexplored, there may be advantages to seeing what the 
learner does spontaneously. Even as simple a recourse as delaying instruction until the learner 
has had a chance to investigate on her own could promote innovation and discovery.  Critically 
however, even a knowledgeable teacher (e.g., one who knows all four functions of our toy), 
cannot know what currently unknown information might be discovered by the variable actions 
children perform in the absence of instruction.  Because the total amount of information that 
might be learned is neither fixed nor known, the inductive trade-off introduced by pedagogy is a 
general one. 
  Our results also suggest that direct, ostensive cues are neither sufficient nor necessary for 
children to treat a demonstration as pedagogical.  In cases where children were given direct, 
ostensive  cues  but  there  was  reason  to  believe  that  the  adult  was  not  sampling  evidence  in 
proportion to the probability that it would generate the target hypothesis in the learner (e.g., 
because  the  teacher  was  interrupted  or  naïve),  children  did  not  draw  the  strong  inferences 
licensed by pedagogical sampling (Experiment 1).  Conversely, in cases where children lacked 
direct,  ostensive  cueing  but  a  helpful  teacher  was  instructing  a  learner  with  knowledge 
comparable  to  the  child’s  own,  children  did  assume  pedagogical  sampling  (Experiment  2). 
Importantly,  however,  ostensive  cues  (even  when  directed  to  other  learners)  were  not  in 
themselves sufficient for children to engage pedagogical sampling assumptions.  Consistent with 
our analysis, children suspended these assumptions when the target of the ostensive cueing was 
an adult learner whose beliefs were likely to differ from their own.    Our results support the predictions of our Bayesian model of pedagogy; however, they 
are not inconsistent with the proposals of Csibra, Gergely, and colleagues. We agree with other 
researchers  (Csibra  &  Gergely,  2009;  Tomasello  et  al.,  2005)  that  direct  ostensive  cues  are 
probabilistically associated with pedagogical contexts, and are very likely, not only to guide 
children’s attention to the relevant demonstrations, but also to suggest that the demonstration is 
for the purpose of instruction. Indeed, children’s ability to treat the Indirect Child condition as a 
pedagogical condition may have been supported by the ostensive cues directed towards the other 
child.  Additionally,  note  that  in  our  studies,  children  were  presented  with  a  combination  of 
verbal and non-verbal ostensive cues, whereas other studies (e.g. Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 
2002;  Topal  et  al.,  2008)  have  paired  neutral  language  with  non-verbal  ostensive  cues.  Our 
manipulation was chosen to be an ecologically valid representation of the kinds of input that 
preschool children receive, however, further research might establish whether children would 
constrain their exploration if only non-verbal ostensive cues are used to indicate the pedagogical 
context. Finally, note that Csibra and Gergeley’s claims focus on learning mechanisms present 
during infancy, and it is entirely possible that by the time children reach preschool, they have 
learned that pedagogical contexts apply beyond situations with ostensive cueing.   
  Our finding that children distinguish instruction to adults and other children adds to a 
host of studies suggesting that children are sensitive to the difference between the mental states 
of children and adults.  Preschool children understand that adults know different things than they 
do (Lutz & Keil, 2002), and indeed, children sometimes erroneously attribute omniscience to 
adults  (e.g., Mossler, Marvin, & Greenberg, 1976; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). Such 
results are consistent with our claim that preschoolers assume that other children are learners 
similar to themselves but do not make this assumption about adult learners. Our studies are also consistent with a host of studies suggesting that children can learn vicariously, from overheard 
communication or demonstrations (Correa-Chavez and Rogoff; 2009; Jaswal & Markman, 2003; 
see also Akhtar,  Jipson & Callanan, 2001; Jaswal & Markman, 2001; Tomasello &  Barton, 
1994).    However,  extending  beyond  previous  work,  we  show  that  children  not  only  learn 
overheard  material,  but  also  draw  rational  (if  fallible)  inferences  about  the  absence  of 
information that is not instructed. 
  Although the negative effects of instruction on exploration may seem disheartening, the 
results suggest a striking competence in young children: they are able to negotiate the trade-off 
between exploration and instruction such that they explore more when they can rationally infer 
that there is more information to be learned.  Moreover, children demonstrate this competence 
remarkably early. By preschool, children seem actively to evaluate their teachers both for the 
knowledge  they  have  and  their  ability  to  demonstrate  it.    Thus,  well  before  children  are 
immersed  in  formal  education,  they  are  sensitive  to  some  conditions  that  promote  effective 
instruction.  Furthermore,  the  ability  to  learn  selectively  from  overheard  demonstrations  is 
presumably valuable in a world where children are surrounded by siblings and peers who are 
also subject to adult instruction; by interpreting pedagogical demonstrations to other children as 
they interpret pedagogical demonstrations to themselves, preschoolers can benefit not only from 
information they are taught directly but also from information provided to others.  
  Finally, although the current findings involve young children in a limited instructional 
context, the results suggest the possibility of a new perspective on longstanding debates in the 
field of education.  In classroom contexts, advocates of discovery learning have suggested that 
direct instruction is passive and discourages engagement (Dean & Kuhn, 2006; Papert, 1980), 
whereas advocates of direct instruction have countered that self-guided exploration is inefficient and  often  ineffective  (Vygotsky,  1978;  Kirschner,  Sweller, &  Clark,  2006;  Klahr  &  Nigam, 
2004; Mayer, 2004; Rittle-Johnson, 2006).  The current results suggest that instruction leads to 
inductive biases that create a genuine “double-edged” sword: teaching simultaneously confers 
advantages  for  learning  instructed  information  and  disadvantages  for  learning  untaught 
information. Thus, the decision about how to balance direct instruction and discovery learning 
depends largely on the lesson to be learned.  Inspired by Piaget, the challenge for educators may 
be how to foster learners “capable of doing new things” while simultaneously teaching “what 
other generations have done”. 
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